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Threshold secret sharing schemes encode data into several shares such that a thresh-
old number of shares can be used to recover the data. Such schemes provide confiden-
tiality of stored data without using encryption, thus avoiding the problems associated
with key management. To provide long-term confidentiality, proactive secret sharing
techniques can be used, where shares are refreshed or renewed periodically so that an
adversary who obtains fewer than the threshold shares in each time period does not
learn any information on the encoded data.
Share renewal is an expensive process, in terms of the computation and network
communication involved. In the proactive model, this share renewal process must
complete as soon as possible so that an adversary who compromises servers in the
present time period does not learn shares stored in the last time period. This paper
proposes an algorithm where the shares of all the stored data are renewed by the share
renewal of only one secret. The computation and network communication overheads
are thus drastically reduced, allowing for the share renewal of all the stored data to
complete quickly. These benefits are gained at the expense of some performance penalty
during reads and writes, which is shown to be worthwhile.
Keywords: Distributed data storage, proactive secret sharing, confidentiality, share re-
newal, mobile adversary
1 Introduction
The problem of providing distributed data storage service has received much attention [1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. The stored data can be kept confidential
by using either encryption or secret sharing techniques. While symmetric key encryption
algorithms are typically much faster than secret sharing techniques and suited for real-
time access to data, they do have some drawbacks. Key-based algorithms suffer from the
problem of key management. A key management infrastructure is required, which should
take care of changes in access control. If the confidential data is long-lived, then it cannot
be guaranteed that encryption algorithms will remain secure for a long time. Changes in the
key or the encryption algorithm will require a trusted authority to decrypt and re-encrypt
all the stored data with a new key, which may not be practical. Hence, in the context of
providing confidential data storage for data that is long-lived or archival in nature, encryption
algorithms may not be suitable.
Secret sharing algorithms [16, 17], on the other hand, do not use cryptographic keys. The
data is encoded into shares so that some qualified subsets of them can be used to recover the
data. A (k, n) secret sharing scheme generates n shares of a secret S, such that the knowledge
of any k shares is enough to reconstruct the secret S. Perfect secret sharing schemes, also
known as threshold schemes, have the additional property that knowledge of fewer than k
shares does not give any information on the encoded data. These properties are provided
without requiring any encryption, thus avoiding the issues associated with key management.
Though threshold schemes were traditionally used to store keys in a distributed set of servers,
some works [18, 19, 12] have also considered storing generic data using threshold schemes.
If the shares are distributed to a group of servers, then the secret can be eventually
recovered by an adversary by his compromising any k servers, assuming each server gets one
share. So to provide long-term confidentiality, proactive secret sharing [20, 21, 22] techniques
can be used. In proactive secret sharing, servers periodically engage in a distributed share
renewal protocol where the shares of the secret are refreshed or renewed. The new shares of
the secret are incompatible with the shares used to store the secret before the share renewal
process. This prevents an adversary from gathering a consistent set of k shares of the secret
over time.
Typical data storage systems store orders of magnitude of data objects. If each data
object were to be stored using secret sharing, then share renewal of all the data objects will
incur significant computation and network communication overheads. This severely limits
the scalability of proactive secret sharing techniques for large volumes of data. Our proposed
solution allows for the share renewal of all the secrets (or data objects) stored in the system
by the share renewal of only one secret, thereby drastically reducing the computation and
network communication overheads. The proposed algorithm is thus critical for keeping large
volumes of data proactively confidential.
2 The Problem
Consider a system in which there are n servers, and a (potentially unlimited) number of
clients which read and write secrets to the servers. To write a secret, a client generates n
shares of the secret using a (k, n)-threshold scheme, and securely gives each server one share.
To read a secret, a client contacts as many servers as necessary to retrieve k shares as a
(k, n)-threshold scheme is being used for the secret sharing.
To keep the secrets proactively secure, the n servers have to periodically engage in a
share renewal protocol to generate new shares of the secrets. When the number of secrets is
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large, this process can take a long time, and cause heavy computation and communication
overheads. How to reduce these overheads, which arise due to the share renewal of a large
number of secrets, is the problem addressed in this paper.
The proposed solution involves maintaining a system secret, denoted by U , which is not
known to any client. The servers generate a new sharing for U , and use these shares to
renew the shares of all the stored secrets. Thus, only one share renewal protocol is run to
renew the shares of all the clients’ secrets. The communication overhead is thus due to only
one run of the share renewal protocol, and the computation overhead on the servers is also
reduced. Thus, the proposed solution can be used to achieve efficient proactive security.
3 Preliminaries
Let the secrets belong to Abelian group AG1, and the shares belong to Abelian group AG2.
The group AG1 is Abelian with respect to the binary operator ⊕, while the group AG2 is
Abelian with respect to the binary operator ⊗. Given k shares, s1,1, ..., s1,k, of the secret
S1 that were generated using a k-threshold scheme, the secret S1 can be reconstructed by
computing s1,1 ⊗ s1,2 ⊗ ... ⊗ s1,k. In (⊕,⊗)-homomorphic (k, n)-threshold schemes [23], if
shares of S1 are (s1,1, s1,2, ..., s1,n), and
shares of S2 are (s2,1, s2,2, ..., s2,n),
then shares of (S1 ⊕ S2) are ((s1,1 ⊗ s2,1), (s1,2 ⊗ s2,2), ..., (s1,n ⊗ s2,n)).
In this paper, we consider (⊕,⊗)-homomorphic (k, n)-threshold schemes. An example of
a (⊕,⊗)-homomorphic (k, n)-threshold scheme is Shamir’s scheme [16], which is a (+, +)-
homomorphic (k, n)-threshold scheme.
Since AG1 and AG2 are Abelian groups, there exists an identity element, denoted by
01 ∈ AG1 and 02 ∈ AG2 respectively, for each of the two groups. That is, for an element
S1 ∈ AG1, S1 ⊕ 01 = S1, and for an element s1,1 ∈ AG2, s1,1 ⊗ 02 = s1,1.
In each of the two Abelian groups, there also exist an inverse for every element in the
group. For example, for an element S1 ∈ AG1, there exists a unique inverse denoted by
S−11 ∈ AG1 such that S1 ⊕ S
−1
1 = 01. Likewise, for an element s1,1 ∈ AG2, there exists a
unique inverse denoted by s−11,1 ∈ AG2 such that s1,1 ⊗ s
−1
1,1 = 02.
There are times in the text where a computation such as s ⊗ s ⊗ ... ⊗ s (RS times) or
S ⊕S ⊕ ...⊕S (RS times) may need to be performed. This is written abbreviated as RSs or
RSS respectively.
4 Protocol Description
The protocol in the presence of passive adversaries, i.e., adversaries interested only in recov-
ering data and not in corrupting them, is described in this section.
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4.1 Initialization and Maintenance of the System Secret
When the system is first initialized, the servers come up with a secret they will maintain
using a (⊕,⊗)-homomorphic (k, n) threshold scheme. The share renewal of this system secret,
denoted by U , allows the renewal of shares of all the data objects stored at the servers. The
system secret U must be generated such that no subset of (k − 1) servers can collectively
find U . Also, the proposed algorithm requires generation and maintenance of the inverse of
the system secret, denoted by U−1.
At start, the identity element of AG1, 01, is secret shared using an (⊕,⊗)-homomorphic
(n, n) threshold scheme by a system administrator, and each server is given one share, i.e.,
server i receives share 01,i. This secret sharing need not be secret and can be done pub-
licly. To set up the unknown system secret U , each server comes up with a random number
ui ∈ AG2 secretly. The n shares are now understood to represent the unknown system secret
U using an (⊕,⊗)-homomorphic (n, n) threshold scheme. Each server i, from its share of U
and 01, can find its share of U
−1 by computing u
(I)
i = 01,i ⊗ (ui)
−1. The correctness of this
sharing can be seen below:
U ⊕ U−1 = 01
⇒ (u1 ⊗ u
(I)
1 , u2 ⊗ u
(I)
2 , ..., un ⊗ u
(I)
n ) = (01,1, 01,2, ..., 01,n)
i.e., ui ⊗ u
(I)
i = 01,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
⇒ u
(I)
i = 01,i ⊗ u
−1
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Servers then redistribute the shares of U and U−1 from an (n, n)-threshold scheme to a
(k, n)-threshold scheme using a protocol such as Desmedt and Jajodia’s [24]. The shares of
01 can be deleted after this secret redistribution. Successful deletion of the shares of 01 is
not required for the security of the system. However, reliable deletion of the shares of U and
U−1 corresponding to the (n, n)-threshold scheme is required to maintain proactive security.
Let the n shares of U−1 distributed using the (k, n)-threshold scheme be denoted by
(u
−a,1, u−a,2, ..., u−a,n). Successive share renewals of U
−1 will produce shares denoted by
u
−b,i’s, u−c,i’s, and so on. Let the n shares of U distributed using the (k, n)-threshold scheme
be denoted by (u1,1, u1,2, ..., u1,n). Successive share renewals of U will produce shares denoted
by u2,i’s, u3,i’s, and so on. The shares of U and U
−1 are renewed periodically to preserve the
confidentiality of the system secret U . New sharings of U are also required in the proposed
share renewal algorithm.
4.2 Data Write Protocol
This section describes the data write protocol followed by the servers and the users or clients
when a secret is written. These secrets are called user secrets, as opposed to the system
secret U .
To write a user secret S1, a client generates n shares of S1 using the (⊕,⊗)-homomorphic
(k, n) threshold scheme, and gives each server securely its share. Let the shares of S1 thus
generated be denoted by s1,1, s1,2,...,s1,n. Upon receiving a write request, servers engage in a
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share renewal protocol on U to generate a new sharing of U . For the write to secret S1, let
the sharing of U generated be denoted by (s2,1, s2,2, ..., s2,n). Each server “adds” (⊗) its new
share of U to its share of S1, and permanently deletes the new share of U . Note that this
share renewal of U is not for keeping U proactively secure. The new sharing of U is added
to the received shares in the write request and the new sharing of U is permanently deleted.
Thus, the secret S1 is stored at the servers as S1 ⊕ U after a write.
The share renewal of U for the purpose of writes need not be performed as and when
writes are received. They can be run in anticipation of new writes, but all such sharings
must be deleted before the servers transition into the next time period. In networks where
there is no broadcast channel, an agreement protocol needs to be run amongst the servers
during writes, and a share renewal on U could be accomplished as part of the agreement
process.
For each data object or secret, a replicated variable is maintained by the servers. When
the secret S1 is written, servers create a variable RS1 and initialize it to 1.
4.3 The Data Share Renewal Protocol
The algorithm works by altering the secrets when share renewal is done, but by a known
quantity which is the system secret U .
At the time period boundaries, servers engage in a share renewal protocol on system
secret U to generate a new set of shares of U that will be used to refresh the shares of all the
user secrets stored in the system. Denote one such sharing of U generated for this purpose
by u2,1, u2,2, .., u2,n.
Servers “add”(⊗) these shares of U to the shares of all the encoded data objects to renew
the shares. That is, server i “adds” (⊗) u2i to the current share it has for all the data
objects stored, and then reliably deletes u2i. Thus, the shares of user secret S1 now stored
at the servers correspond to the secret S1 ⊕U ⊕U = S1 ⊕ 2U . The replicated variable RS1 is
incremented by one. In general, the shares of S1 currently stored at the servers correspond
to the secret S1 ⊕ RS1U , where RS1 − 1 share renewals on secret S1 have taken place since
S1 was last written.
4.4 Data Read Protocol
When a client requests user secret S1, servers must return shares of S1. To accomplish this,
servers add RS1 times umi (u−a,i ⊗u−a,i ⊗ ...⊗u−a,i (RS1 times)) to the share it has currently
for Si and returns the sum (⊗). The shares received are thus that of secret S1, because the
resulting secret read will be
(S1 ⊕ RS1U) ⊕ (RS1U
−1) = S1 ⊕ (RS1U ⊕ RS1U
−1) = S1 ⊕ 01 = S1
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5 Security Analysis
We first present an informal analysis of the security of the share renewal algorithm.
We first show why U must be kept secret. Consider a client who has read and write
access to user secret S2, but has no such access to another user secret S1. The client knows
the system secret U and is interested in finding out S1. When secret S2 is written to the
servers, the client is aware of the shares generated to represent S2. He then compromises
k− 1 servers, and finds the u
−a,i’s used to store U
−1. Since he knows U and U−1, from these
k − 1 shares he can figure out the u
−a,i’s stored at other servers. The client does a read on
secret S2, and since he knows the u−a,i’s, he can figure out the shares of S2 ⊕ U stored at
the servers. From this, the client can figure out the shares of U , say u2,i’s, used at the time
S2 was written. The client also learns of k − 1 shares of secret S1 ⊕ U stored at the k − 1
compromised servers.
At the next time period boundary, these k− 1 compromised servers have been corrected,
and share renewal takes place. In the subsequent time period, the client compromises a
different set of k−1 servers. From the new shares of U−1 stored at these servers, he can figure
out all the new umi’s. He now does a read on S2. Server i will return s2,i ⊗u2,i ⊗u3,i ⊗ 2u−a,i,
where the u3,i’s are the shares of U “added” (⊗) to the shares of all the user secrets stored
in the system during the share renewal phase. The client is aware of all the quantities in the
above expression except the u3,i’s, the shares of U added to the shares of all the user secrets
at the time of share renewal. The client can hence find out the u3,i’s.
From one of the compromised servers, say the ith server, the client can find out the new
share for secret S1 after the share renewal, which will be s1,i⊗u4,i⊗u3,i. Since he knows u3,i,
he can find out the “old” share for S1, which is s1,i ⊗ u4,i. The client already has k− 1 “old”
shares of secret S1, or rather that of S1 ⊕ U , and with this additional share he can recover
S1 ⊕ U . Since the client knows U , he can find out S1.
Hence, U must be kept secret.
We next explain why when a secret is written by a client, its shares are not stored as they
are, and instead modified to store the secret ⊕ U . Assume that when secret S2 is written, its
shares are written unmodified. So when a client does a read on S2 before any share renewal
has taken place, he gets the shares he originally generated for S2. Secret S1, that the client
is not allowed to access, is also stored as the original shares generated by its owner. The
client compromises k − 1 servers, and finds out k − 1 shares of secret S1.
At the next time period boundary, share renewal takes place for all the user secrets as
well as for the system secret U and U−1. In the following time period, the client compromises
another set of k−1 servers. The shares of secret S2 stored at these servers are, say, s2,i⊗u2,i’s.
Since the client is aware of the s2,i’s, he can find out k − 1 u2,i’s. The shares of secret S1
stored at these compromised servers are s1,i⊗u2,i. Since the client is aware of the u2,i’s stored
at these compromised servers, he can find out an additional k − 1 shares of secret S1 (the
s1,i’s). The client has already obtained upto k− 1 shares of secret S1 (that belong to the set
of s1,i’s) from the earlier time period. Since he now has more than k − 1 shares of S1 (the
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s1,i’s), he can find out secret S1.
To avoid this scenario, at the time a user secret is written, the shares are modified to
store the user secret ⊕ U . Also, the shares of U used at the time of a user-secret write is
never used for other writes so that there exists no correlation between the stored shares of
any two user secrets. Since the set of shares of U used at the time of writes to user secrets
will never be used again, it must be deleted permanently from its local storage. This deletion
must be done before the next immediate time period boundary.
To prove the security formally, we assume the existence of a client C who has read and
write access to user secrets S2, S3, ..., and is interested in finding out user secret S1 or the
system secret U . The client C is hence also an adversary.
Theorem 1 An adversary C, who has complete read and writes access over some user
secrets, cannot recover the system secret U .
Proof: Since a (k, n) threshold scheme is used throughout, an adversary can recover U
if he is able to find at least k consistent shares of U , while k − 1 shares of U will reveal no
information about U .
The shares used to store U−1, the u
−a,i’s, are protected by periodic share renewal. Hence,
an adversary cannot learn any information about U from these set of shares.
Sets of shares of U are created during a time period for data object writes, and are either
used up during writes or are permanently deleted at the end of a time period. Hence, the
same sets of shares of U are unavailable in plain text at the servers in more than one time
period. Since only a maximum of k − 1 servers can be in the compromised state in a time
period, and the sets of shares of U are generated using a k-threshold scheme, an adversary
cannot learn U from these sets of shares.
Let the client / adversary C have full read and write access to user secret S2, and be
interested in finding out system secret U . When user secret S2 is written by client C, let
the shares of S2 generated using a (k, n)- threshold scheme be denoted by s2,i’s. To store
S2 as S2 ⊕ U , let the servers use the shares of U denoted by u2,i’s. The shares of S2 are
hence stored at the servers as s2,i ⊗ u2,i’s. Let the current set of shares used to store U
−1
at the servers be denoted by u
−a,i’s. When C does a read on S2 from all the servers, it
obtains shares s2,i ⊗u2,i ⊗u−a,i’s. Since C is aware of the s2,i’s, he can find out u2,i ⊗u−a,i for
i = 1, 2, ..., n. These shares correspond to the secret U ⊕ U−1 = 01, the identity element in
Abelian group AG1, and as such are of no use in finding out U . Without loss of generality,
assume that C compromises the first k − 1 servers in this time period. C thus obtains the
first k − 1 shares of u2,i and the first k − 1 shares of u−a,i. The u2,i’s and the u−a,i’s are
two different sets of shares. With only k − 1 shares from each set, an adversary cannot
recover U as a k-threshold scheme was used. To prove that even the knowledge of the n
(u2,i ⊗ u−a,i)’s will not help in finding U , consider the following example. Fix a certain value
for U , and from u2,1, ..., u2,k−1 and u−a,1, ..., u−a,k−1, the rest of the shares u2,k, ..., u2,n and
u
−a,k, ..., u−a,n can be fixed. The adversary C is aware of u2,i ⊗ u−a,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, out of which
the shares u2,1, ..., u2,k−1 and u−a,1, ..., u−a,k−1 were used to calculate the rest of the shares
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u2,i’s and u−a,i’s. The secret that will be recovered from (u2,i ⊗ u−a,i)’s using the calculated
u2,i’s and u−a,i’s will correspond to the secret U ⊕ U
−1 = 0, the identity element which is
independent of U . Out of the read (u2,i ⊗ u−a,i)’s and the calculated (u2,i ⊗ u−a,i)’s, k − 1 of
the (u2,i ⊗ u−a,i)’s are identical and both correspond to the secret “01.” Therefore, since a
k-threshold scheme was used, the rest of the share sets (the read and the computed) must
also be identical.
Hence, the knowledge of k − 1 u2,i’s and k − 1 u−a,i’s, and all the (u2,i ⊗ u−a,i)’s, will not
reveal any information on the system secret U .
In the subsequent time period, assume the set of shares of U denoted by u2,i’s were
generated and “added” (⊗) to the shares of all the user secrets in order to renew their
shares. The shares of S2 stored at the servers are hence s2,i ⊗ u2,i ⊗ u3,i. Also, the shares
used to store U , the u
−a,i’s, were replaced with u−b,i’s.
When client C does a read on S2 from all the servers, he gets (s2,i ⊗u2,i ⊗u3,i ⊗ 2u−b,i)’s,
i = 1, 2, ..., n. C can thus obtain (u2,i⊗u3,i⊗2u−b,i)’s, i = 1, 2, ..., n. These shares correspond
again to the secret zero and as such are of no use in finding U . Even the knowledge of
(u2,i ⊗ u−a,i), i = 1, 2, ..., n, from the last time period does not help as the u−a,i’s have been
replaced with u
−b,i’s.
By compromising k − 1 servers in this time period, C can obtain k − 1 (u2,i ⊗ u3,i)’s and
k − 1 u
−b,i’s. C is already aware of k − 1 shares of u2,i and u−a,i from the last time period.
Since the u
−a,i’s have been replaced by u−b,i’s in the new time period, the adversary can find
out U only by recovering additional shares of u2,i. For this, C needs to be aware of some of
the u3,i’s.
The u3,i’s are however unavailable in plain text and have been “added” to the shares of
all the data objects. The u3,i’s can be recovered only by compromising servers while the
share renewal process was in progress. Servers compromised during the share renewal phase,
however, are considered as compromised in the current and the last time periods. Hence,
an adversary who has compromised a server during the share renewal phase will anyway
be aware of the u2,i stored at the compromised server. So new u2,i’s can be found by the
adversary.
Also, it can be seen that not more than k − 1 u3,i’s can be found by the adversary. If
the adversary was able to find a certain u3,i, that would have been possible only because the
adversary was aware of the u2,i stored at that server. The adversary could not recover more
than k− 1 u2,i’s used in the earlier time period. By induction, it can be seen that even after
subsequent time periods and share renewals, k consistent shares of U can never be found. It
can also be seen that the knowledge of user secrets in addition to user secret S2 does not help
the adversary C in any way. The adversary is hence unable to find out the system secret U .
Theorem 2 An adversary C, who has read and write access to some user secrets, cannot
recover a user secret to which he has no read access.
Proof: Assume a client / adversary C knows user secrets S2, S3, ... and is interested in
finding user secret S1. To find secret S1, the adversary must obtain at least k consistent
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shares of S1 by compromising as many servers. Since a random set of shares of system secret
U is used to store S1 when it is written, and this set of shares of U is never used again to
store other secrets, there is no correlation between shares of S1 and any other secret. Hence,
the knowledge of other secrets is of no use to the adversary interested in finding the secret
S1.
Assume the set of shares of U used to encode S1 as S1 ⊕ U when S1 was written are
denoted by u2,i’s. By the compromise of k − 1 servers at the time the secret S1 was written,
the adversary C may be able to obtain k− 1 shares of S1 and k− 1 shares of U used to store
S1 as S1 ⊕ U . In the next time period and following the share renewal, the adversary can
obtain k− 1 (s1,i ⊗u2,i ⊗u3,i)’s, where the u3,i’s are the shares of U used to renew the shares
of all the user secrets during the share renewal. The adversary has to now compromise a
server other than the servers compromised in the earlier time period in order to recover new
shares of S1. Since at the currently compromised servers, the (u2,i ⊗ u3,i)’s are not known to
the adversary (from Theorem 1, the system secret U cannot be found by the adversary), the
adversary will be unable to recover k consistent s1,i’s. It can be seen that this result holds
during subsequent share renewals also.
The secret S1 can also be recovered from k consistent shares of S1 ⊕ U ⊕ U
−1, or from k
consistent shares of S1 ⊕ 2U ⊕ 2U
−1. That is, S1 can be found from k consistent (s1,i ⊗u2,i ⊗
u
−a,i)’s, or k consistent (s1,i ⊗ u2,i ⊗ u3,i ⊗ 2u−b,i)’s. Since the shares used to store U
−1, the
u
−a,i’s, are changed (renewed) at every time period boundary (in this case, to u−b,i’s), it is
not possible to obtain k consistent u
−a,i’s or u−b,i’s. Hence, k consistent (s1,i ⊗ u2,i ⊗ u−a,i)’s
or k consistent (s1,i ⊗ u2,i ⊗ u3,i ⊗ u−b,i)’s cannot be recovered by the adversary.
Hence, even with the knowledge of some user secrets and with the ability to compromise
at most k − 1 servers in every time period, the adversary will be unable to find out other
user secrets.
From a practical standpoint, it may be advisable to change the system secret every now
and then because the security of the entire system rests on maintaining the secrecy of the
system secret. Even after the system secret is changed, the past system secrets should never
be discovered. This is because an adversary could have collected shares over several time
periods, and with the knowledge of the system secret used then, he will be able to decipher
user secrets stored in those time periods. The system secret must therefore be changed as a
safety precaution.
To change the system secret from U to V , the procedure used to setup shares of U and
U−1 are followed again to obtain shares of V and V −1. Note that the system secrets are not
known even to the system administrator as each server generates its own random share. For
a secret, say S1, stored in the system, server i computes its new share of S1 with respect to
system secret V by computing s1,i ⊗ u2,i ⊗ ...⊗ u3,i ⊗RS1u−a,i ⊗ v2,i, where the u−a,i’s are the
current shares used to store U−1 and the v2,i’s are the shares of V “added” (⊗) to the shares
of all the user secrets. RS1 is initialized back to 1. When S1 is read, the shares returned will
be of the form s1,i ⊗ u2,i ⊗ ... ⊗ u3,i ⊗ RS1u−a,i ⊗ v2,i ⊗ v−a,i, where the v−a,i’s are the shares
currently being used to store V −1.
The following theorem states that when the system secret is changed, the confidentiality
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of the user and system secrets will be maintained.
Theorem 3 Let the secret U be changed to V . An adversary who has read and write access
to some user secrets will not be able to recover V or any other user secret in the process.
Proof: When U is changed to V , a fresh set of shares, v
−a,i’s, are used to store V
−1, and
another set of shares, v2,i’s, are used to refresh the shares of all the secrets stored in the
system.
From Theorem 1, where the knowledge of some secret is assumed in order to find U , it
is clear that the present system secret V cannot be learnt.
In order to prove that the user secrets cannot be found when the current system secret
U is changed to V , consider the time periods before and after the share renewal phase when
U was changed to V . Denote these time periods as T1 and T2 respectively.
Going back to the proof of Theorem 2, at the time of the first share renewal of a secret,
the same set of shares of U was added to the shares of all the secrets stored in the system.
The adversary knew a maximum of k − 1 shares of s1,i ⊗ u2,i or s1,i ⊗ u2,i ⊗ u3,i, and it was
shown that the adversary would not be able to find out secret S1.
Likewise, in this case, a maximum of k − 1 shares of secret S1 as stored in the system at
time period T1 are known to the adversary. From Theorem 2, more than k−1 shares cannot
be known to the adversary. Instead of adding a new set of shares of U and refreshing the
shares of U−1 during share renewal, here a new set of shares of a new system secret V are
being added to the shares of all the secrets stored in the system, and a new set of shares are
used to store V −1. Noting that the v
−a,i’s used to store V
−1 are share-renewed at the time
period boundaries, the analysis to prove that secret S1 cannot be found by the adversary is
similar to Theorem 2.
6 Performance Analysis
In this section, we show the benefits gained by the proposed algorithm over traditional
methods where each secret (or data object) is share-renewed independently.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [16] along with the share renewal scheme proposed in
Herzberg et al. [21] is used for the analysis. In Shamir’s scheme, the Abelian groups AG1
and AG2 are both Zp, where p is a prime number. As mentioned earlier, Shamir’s scheme is
a (+, +)-homomorphic (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
A brief overview of the share renewal algorithm for Shamir’s scheme proposed in Herzberg
et al. [21] is as follows: To renew a secret, each server uses a (k, n)-threshold Shamir’s scheme
to generate n shares of 01 = 0, the zero element in AG1. This step involves computing
(k − 1) modular multiplications and (k − 2) modular additions. These n shares are given
to the respective servers securely. Each server thus receives n shares of 0, and it adds these
shares to its share of the secret which is being share-renewed. This step therefore involves
n modular additions. The network communication cost is n2l bits, where l is the length in




Computation Overhead (k − 1) mod mults 0 mults
during writes (n + k − 2) mod adds 0 adds
Communication Overhead n2l bits 0 bits
during writes
Computation Overhead 3(k − 1) mod mults ND(k − 1) mod mults
during share renewal 3(n + k − 2) + ND mod adds ND(n + k − 2) mod adds
Communication Overhead 3n2l bits NDn
2l bits
during share renewal
Computation Overhead 1 mod mult 0 mod mults
during reads 1 mod adds 0 mod adds
Table 1: Comparison between the proposed algorithm against independent share
renewal of each secret
In our proposed algorithm, there are computation and communication overheads during
reads and writes, which straightforward share renewal of each secret does not incur any over-
heads during reads and writes. Note that we are restricting our study to passive adversaries,
where only the confidentiality of the data is at stake and there is no malicious behavior of
servers. Table 1 compares our proposed algorithm against the straightforward case where
each secret is managed independently (called the “traditional approach”).
The efficiency of the share renewal of all the stored data is clear from the table. Mul-
tiplication operations incur a higher overhead than addition operations, and the proposed
algorithm performs only a constant number of multiplications which is independent of the
number of user secrets ND. The number of additions that need to be performed are also
reduced by a factor of (n + k − 2). In the proposed algorithm, three runs of the share re-
newal protocol must be done: one for preserving the confidentiality of U , another for U−1,
and finally to generate a new sharing to renew all the user secrets. This contrasts with the
traditional approach where each secret is independently share-renewal, thus leading to ND
runs of the share renewal protocol. Thus, share renewal using our proposed algorithm can
complete sooner. This is essential in the proactive security model, which assumes that no
more than k − 1 servers are compromised in each time period. By quick share renewal of all
the user secrets, chances of compromising a server in the current time period and obtaining
shares in the earlier time period is very much reduced.
These benefits come at the cost of overheads during writes and reads. There is one
invocation of the share renewal protocol during writes in the proposed algorithm. For data
that is archival in nature, it can be expected that there are very few writes in a time
period while the number of stored user secrets could be very large. So this tradeoff may
be worthwhile. Moreover, when active adversaries or faulty clients are considered, servers
must engage in an agreement protocol during writes to ensure that the received shares are
consistent (any k shares give the same secret). A share renewal protocol can be piggy-backed
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onto such an agreement protocol. Due to space constraints, we do not give details on such
methods.
The performance penalty incurred during a read is negligible. For each read, a server
has to perform only one modular multiplication and one modular addition, but traditional
schemes do not incur any overhead. Read requests arrive at different times during a time pe-
riod, while share renewal of all user secrets is done at the time period boundaries. This share
renewal must complete as quickly as possible, and this is paramount. The proposed algo-
rithm achieves this while incurring some overheads during reads, which is a very worthwhile
tradeoff.
7 Conclusions
An algorithm for efficient share renewal of a large number of secrets is given. The algorithm
achieves efficiency by refreshing shares of all the secrets by the share renewal of only one se-
cret, called the “system secret.” The efficiency is gained at the expense of some performance
penalties during reads and writes, but there is no loss of security. If the underlying algo-
rithms provide information-theoretic secrecy, then the proposed algorithm maintains that
level of security.
The proposed algorithm is well suited in data storage applications where data is archival
in nature, and long-term confidentiality of the data must be provided. Since secret sharing
techniques form the basis of the proposed work, applications where key management is a
problem will also find the proposed algorithm attractive.
References
[1] M. Herlihy and J. D. Tygar, “How to make replicated data secure,” in Crypto, 1987.
[2] G. Agrawal and P. Jalote, “Coding based replication schemes for distributed systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 240–251, 1995.
[3] A. Iyengar, R. Cahn, C. Jutla, and J. Garay, “Design and implementation of a secure
distributed data repository,” in Proceedings of the 14th IFIP International Information
Security Conference, 1998.
[4] Y. Chen, J. Edler, A. Goldberg, A. Gottlieb, S. Sobti, and P. Yianilos, “A prototype
implementation of archival intermemory,” in Proceedings of the 4th ACM International
Conference on Digital Libraries, 1999.
[5] J. Kubiatowicz, D. Bindel, Y. Chen, S. Czerwinski, P. Eaton, D. Geels, R. Gummadi,
S. Rhea, H. Weatherspoon, W. Weimer, C. Wells, and B. Zhao, “Oceanstore: An archi-
tecture for global-scale persistent storage,” in Proceedings of the 9th ASPLOS, 2000.
[6] R. J. Anderson, “The eternity service,” in Proceedings of the 1st International Confer-
ence on Theory and Application of Cryptography (Pragocrypt), 1996.
12
[7] I. Clarke, O. Sandberg, B. Wiley, and T. W. Hong, “Freenet: A distributed anonymous
information storage and retrieval system,” in Proceedings of the ICSI Workshop on
Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, 2000.
[8] M. Waldman, A. D. Rubin, and L. F. Cranor, “Publius: A robust, tamper-evident,
censorship-resistant web publishing system,” in Proceedings of the 9th Usenix Security
Symposium, 2000.
[9] R. Dingledine, M. J. Freedman, and D. Molnar, “The free haven project: Distributed
anonymous storage service,” in Proceedings of the International Workshop on Design
Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, 2000.
[10] S. Lakshmanan, M. Ahamad, and H. Venkateswaran, “A secure and highly available
distributed store for meeting diverse systems and networks,” in Proceedings of the In-
ternational Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2001.
[11] L. Kong, A. Subbiah, M. Ahamad, and D. Blough, “A reconfigurable Byzantine quorum
approach for the agile store,” in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Reliable
Distributed Systems, 2003.
[12] A. Subbiah, M. Ahamad, and D. M. Blough, “Using Byzantine quorum systems to
manage confidential data,” Tech. Rep. GIT-CERCS-04-13, Georgia Tech Center for
Experimental Research on Computer Systems, 2004.
[13] “The agile store project.” http://www.ece.gatech.edu/research/labs/agile store.
[14] “Pasis.” http://www.pdl.cmu.edu/Pasis.
[15] “Mojonation.” http://www.mojonation.net.
[16] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11,
pp. 612–613, 1979.
[17] G. R. Blakley, “Safeguarding cryptographic keys,” in Proceedings of the National Com-
puter Conference, 1979.
[18] T. M. Wong, C. Wang, and J. M. Wing, “Verifiable secret redistribution for archive
systems,” in Proceedings of the 1st International IEEE Security in Storage Workshop,
2002.
[19] S. Lakshmanan, M. Ahamad, and H. Venkateswaran, “Responsive security for stored
data,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 818–
828, 2003.
[20] R. Ostrovsky and M. Yung, “How to withstand mobile virus attacks,” in Proceedings of
the 10th Symposium on the Principles of Distributed Computing, 1991.
13
[21] A. Herzberg, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and M. Yung, “Proactive secret sharing or: How
to cope with perpetual leakage,” in Crypto, 1995.
[22] R. Canetti, R. Gennaro, A. Herzberg, and D. Naor, “Proactive security: Long term
protection against breakins,” RSA Laboratories’ Cryptobytes, vol. 3, no. 1, 1997.
[23] J. Benaloh, “Secret sharing homomorphisms: Keeping shares of a secret secret,” in
Crypto, 1986.
[24] Y. Desmedt and S. Jajodia, “Redistributing secret shares to new access structures and
its applications,” Tech. Rep. ISSE TR-97-01, George Mason University, 1997.
14
